In 2002, combined profits for the ten largest United
States drug manufacturers' combined profits totaled
$35.9 billion, more than five-and-one-half times the
mean profit grossed by all other industries represented
in the Fortune 500.1 Drug companies' profits
continue to escalate exponentially, in part due to an
increase in the purchase price of pharmaceuticals.2
Critics of the industry contend that higher purchase
prices bar indigent individuals' access to affordable
pharmaceuticals, including live-saving medicines. In
response, drug companies emphasize that expensive
research and development costs are driving the high
prices." Phannaceutical companies profess the need
to gross more profit in order to offset these costs,
accordingly, the pharmaceutical industry supports
strong intellectual property rights to protect against
the unauthorized production of generic mxedicines
("generics") that might detract from their profits.
In most nations, prior the World Trade Organization's
(WTO) ratification of Teade-Related Aspects of
IntellectualfPropertRights(TRIPS)' in 1994, domestic
pharmaceutical companies manufactured generics
without restraint and sold them at reduced retail
prices.' Although ITRIPS imposed souse restraints on
these manufacturers, many W1 members recognized
the importance of public health considerations.
Accordingly, to circumvent these restraints, TRIPS
includes provisions which allow WTO members to
manufacture generics in certain situations.
In contrast, U.S. multilateral trade agreements, such
as the Central American Free frac Agreement Dominincan Republic (CATIA-DR), prohibit smaller
pharmaceutical companies from manufacturing
generics, even in situations that are peimissible
under ITRIPS. C'AFbIA-DR reinforces the status quo
by shielding large pharmaceutical companies from
lost profits and preventing poor consumers from
accessing affordable medications by (1) extending the
length of patent terms; (2) failing to explicitly permit
compulsory licenses, and (3) requiring a five-year data
exclusiv ity period.

Developed nations generally advocate for strong
international intellectual property rights because
businesses, such as pharmaceutical companies, that
design innovative products are located within their
borders. TRIPS evolved in response to intense lobbying
from the IS., European Union, and Japan for the WTO
to expand intellectual property rights to an international
scope. IRIPS permits a WTO7 nation to access
international trade markets from a more advantageous
standpoint, provided that the nation accessing the
markets conforms to the stringent intellectual property
laws outlined in TRIPS' provisions.
At the time of ITRIPS enactment, many WI O members
believed that it was inappropriate for a state to issue
pharmaceutical patents, or had never beflore issued
such patents within their borders.' Thus. members
purposefully incorporated exceptions into TRIPS that
allow a state to circumvent intellectual property patent
requirements with respect to pharmaceuticals.? For
instance, compulsory licenses allow a state to compel
a pharmaceutical manufacturer to relinquish its patent
rights to a particular drug. In this situation, the WTO
member nation grants a compulsory license to an
alternate pharmaceutical company to manufacture
an equivalent medicine.'o Normally, a patent
would have prevented the alternate pharmaceutical
company from manufacturing the drug." Under this
exception, a state can grant a compulsory license to
a pharmaceutical company at any time as long as the
state requests permission and compensates the patentholding pharmaceutical company. A state need not
request permission from the patent holder, however,
before issuing a compulsory license during a national
emergency or circumstance, an extreme urgency, or for
public non-commercial consumption.
For mansy ears, developing nations were unsure of
how these flexible provisions would be interpreted.
They consequently feared using them without first
receiving further clarification as to how the compulsory
license provisions would function. The request for
further clarification led meinber nations to convene at
a conference in IDoha, Qatar, to coatithe JDeclaration
on time JRIPS Agreemnent and Public Health (Doha
JDeclaration).'
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During the Doha convention in 2001, each government
entity reiterated that TRIPS contains flexible
provisions to circumvent pharmaceutical patents in
order to ensure that governments can protect public
health.14 1he Doha Declaration not only affined
that states should implement and interpret TRIPS
to support public health by promoting access to
medicines, it also emphasized that states are entitled
to issue compulsory licenses and permit parallel
imports.' Essentially, the Doha Declaration forced
WTO members to acknowledge that a balance must
exist between strict intellectual property rights and
public health. WTO Director-General Mike Moore
stated that TRIPS "... strikes a carefully-negotiated
balance between providing intellectual property
protection . . . and allowing nations the flexibility to

ensure that treatments reach the world's poorest and
most vulnerable people. Countries must feel secure
that they can use this flexibility." 6
Even more significantly, the Doha Declaration
ordered WTO members to further negotiate and
formulate a solution whereby nations lacking domestic
manufacturing capabilities would still have the
opportunity to import generics." Two years later, in
2003, WTO members enacted Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration, explicitly permitting WT1O nations to
issue compulsory licenses to export generic drugs to
other nations which had not previously issued a patent
for a certain pharmaceutical. Prior to the adoption
of Paragraph 6. a WTO member could only issue
compulsory licenses for drugs which would be primarily
consumed within the country's own borders.19
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In spite of lobbying efforts, the United States failed to
obtain the level of intellectual property protection that
it had originally sought during the ITRIPS negotiations.
Specifically, the U.S. feared the overuse of compulsory
licensing and had desired lengthier patents and data
exclusivity to prevent "unfair commercial use."
Instead, the U.S. adopted bilateral and multilateral
trade agreemeints to incorporate these measures."
These aggressisve agreements impose strict intellectual
property rights standards on all countries that are a party
to them and, in turn, help soothe insvestors' wxorries
about losing profit to generic drug manufacturers. 1
CAFlIA-D)R stretches patent protection to an extreme
lesvel which effectixvely bars domestic manufactuems
trom pioducing generics (during the patent term.
Consequently, many citizens in Cential Xmeiica are
denied access to essential medicines due to the lack of
affordable generics.

IAFTA-DR is a multilateral trade
agreement
enacted between the United States and Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic., El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras. and Nicaragua that restricts these Latin
American countries' abilits to manufacture generic
drugs." In addition to this central treaty, each state
has signed multiple side letters with the United States.
A side letter provides an additional understanding
between the parties that goes beyond the main text of a
multilateral trade agreement. UnderstandingRegarding
Certain PublicHealth easures is a side letter which
has been adopted by all parties to CAFTA-DR.2 IThis
agreement, however, does not expand the state's ability
to issue patents to a domestic pharmaceutical company
to manufacture generics.
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CAFTA-DR impedes the ability of domestic drug
companies to manufacture generic medicines by
extending patent lengths. First, CAI IXk-DR Article
15.9 § 6(a) obligates states to adjust the length of a
patent to compensate for unreasonable delays.2 An
"unreasonable delay" occurs when it takes a state longer
than five years to issue a patent." In these situations, if
requested by the pharmaceutical company, the patentissuing state niust adjust the length of the patent term
to compensate for the delay. "In TRIPS, however, the
patent term is limited to twenty years.>Although WTO
members raised the prospect of extending patent terms
to compensate for regulatory delays, the WIG failed
to enact this provision in ITRIPS; thus TRIPS does not
obligate states in the same manner as CAFTIA-DR in
this regard."
Moreover, CAFTA-DR Article 15.9 § 6(b) further
extends patent lengths by demanding that nations
automatically toll the original patent term if an
"unreasonable curtailment" occurs during the
marketing process.
Although CAFIA-DR Article
15.9 § 6(a) provides examples of an "unreasonable
delay,"
the meaning of the term "unreasonable
curtailment" is left ambiguous. Thus. it is unclear boxy
a WIG member should interpret an "unreasonable
curtailment." In lay man's terms, the definition of
'curtailment" is "to make less by or in some xway
cut off some part." Read narroxxly in CAFTIA-D)R,
the term "unreasonable" wxould modify curtailment.
hence, only a drastic impediment or situation arising
duiing the marketing piocess xxould force a state to
reinstate the tull patent term. Yet, read bioadly, an
"unieasonable curtailment' could apply to any (delay
during the marketing process.

use," TRIPS allows states even greater flexibility by

eliminating the requirement to request permission from
the patent holder altogether." By explicitly permitting
a state to waive a patent when necessary TRIPS gives
aWTO member more extensive rights than the Central
American countries are provided under CAFTA-DR.

Due to the
lack of clarity,
amanutacturer could
coneeixvably argue that any and all
delaxys duiing the marketing process aie unieasonable
up until the time the drug enteis the market. In ettect,
runlike T RIPS. wxhere the twxenty -year patent term
begins on the date ot application, under CAETAk-DR,
the txxenty -y ear patent length can begin many y eairs
later. By xxax of this proxvision, CAFETA-DR pioxvides
U.S,. phannaeeutieal companies far greater protections
in foreign countries than they would reeeixve under a
patent filed in the United States.
In sum.

CAFTA-DR

automatically extends the
length of a patent term and thus prexveats domestic
manufaeturers trom dcxveloping generies xxithout
a compulsomy license. In tturn. the pharmaceutieal
eompany wxill hold a lengthier monopoly oxver the
patent, making it more difficult for indigentt persons to
obtain reasonably prieed drugs.

CAFTA-DR fails to include the most integral public
health provision in TRIPS - the provision pertaining
to compulsory licensing. IRIPS Article 31 states that,
if permxitted by local laws, a nation can authorize a
third party to disregard a pharmaceutical comxpany's
patent and produce generics if the state had previously
requested permission from the patent holder and the
request had been unfulfilled after areasonable period of
time." Therefore, a state does not need to obtain actual
authorization; rather, the state only needs to make
efforts to obtain an authorization. Further, in cases
of "a national energency or other circunstances of
extrene urgency or in cases of public non-commercial

lhe United States and the Central American nations
have endorsed a side letter on public health, titled
Lnderstanding Regarding Certain Public Health
Measuares. This side letter attempts to reaffirm that
CAYFTAk-DR does not encroach upon a state's ability
to take necessary measures to protect public health.33
Although this letter appears to offer assurances that
Central American nations can grant compulsory
licenses, it is unlikely that these assurances supersede
CAFTIA-DR Article 11 in Chapter Fifteen that states
must adhere to patent obligations "except as [CAFIADR] provides otherwise.
Moreover, the explicit text
of CAFI A-DR neither recognizes nor incorporates
this side letter.
Further, these letters are only "cominitments" and will
not take the effect of law until the House and Senate
pass legislation to implement the modifications." If
the United States violates this side letter, its reputation
with regard to both trade agreements and side letters
will sour tremendously, a risk the U.S. may not wish
to take. Nevertheless, a belief that the U.S. will not
violate a side letter for fear of ruining its reputation is
not as compelling of a deterrent as a legal prohibition.
Even if this side letter ripens into an enforceable
agreement, it still would not afford sufficient
protection to Central American states to permit
domestic manufacturers to produce generics without
authorization. For example, the CAFTA-DR side
letter is not as flexible as TRIPS because it requires
that measures to protect health be "necessary," and
only permits "access to medicines" with regards to
epidemics, or circumstances of extreme emergencies
such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, Ialaria, and other
epidemics. 6
A "necessary" nmeasuire is a high standard that
is narroxwly defined to balance the dual goals of
Inaintaining the freedom of members to set and achiexve
their ow n regulatory objectixves and discouragino the
adoption of nmeasures xwhich unduly restrict trade.3
Neeessity tests ty pically require that measures wxhich
restrict trade not exceed wxhat is "necessary" to achiexe
a nieiibei's policy objective. UnF
der this fianiework.
the iplementing nation must proxve that aregulation is
necessary and effective, and that no less restrictive trade
measures are available to achieve the same purpose."
In addition, the regulation should not be a "disguised

restriction on international trade" or amount to "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination."40 Thus, if the public health measure is discriminatory to
trade, the measure may be found to be in violation of trade rules, even if the
state did not intend to discriminate. By incorporating the word "necessary"
into the side letter of CA\FTA-DR, the U.S. has dictated a burdensome
standard that Central American nations must meet before they can possibly
begin the production of generics.
Conversely, ITRIPS does not require a member state to prove a legitimate
reason for issuing a compulsory license with regard to national emergencies
or extreme urgencies. Instead, under TRIPS, nations are afforded complete
autonomy to deflne their own national emergencies and extreme urgencies.
Unlike CAFTA-DR. TRIPS does not require member states to prove that
the regulation is necessary or that there are less restrictive alternatives.
The CAFIA-DR side letter overly restricts public health by only permitting
"access to medicines" during times of epidemics, national emergencies,
or extreme circumstances. By listing specific diseases and epidemics,.
the side letter suggests that other public health concerns not explicitly
mentioned may not be covered as a public health exception. As support
that CAFTA-DR allows nations similar. if not identical. flexible provisions
as provided in TRIPS, the United States contends that it supported both
the 2001 Doha Declaration by stating that it would produce drugs needed
to fight epidemics, 41 and also supported the 2003 consensus by allowing
nations to import generic drugs to combat infectious epidemics.42 This
language remains inadequate because it restricts the rights of nations to
manutacture generic drugs during epidemics. In contrast, TRIPS supports
broader member rights than merely "producing drugs to fight epidemics"
or "importing drugs needed for infectious epidemics" because it permits
nations to produce generic drugs to protect the health of all persons beyond
times of epidemic outbreaks.
. CAFIA-DR P-rotects Data Exclusi,
,A1vity
Most nations require that safety and efficacy tests are performed before a
pharmaceutical company is allowed to launch a new drug into the market.
When generic manufacturers want to introduce a generic equivalent of the
original drug, they typically draw on the safety and efficacy tests completed
by the original patent holder and are only required to prove that the generic
drug is therapeutically equivalent to the original.43 Data exclusivity
refers to a time period in which the original manufacturer possesses a
monopoly over the safety and efficacy tests - a period during which a
generic manufacture can not utilize these test results.44 In theory, small
generic manufacturers can introduce generics if the) complete their oxxn
independent safety and efficacy tests; in practice, data exclusixvity creates
a monopoly foi the original patent holder because it is unlikely that small
generic manutacturers wxill haxe the tinancial means to conduct these tests.
CAFTA-DR imposes a mandatory fixve-year data exclusixvity pcriod on a
drug once the original pharnmaccutical company submits undisclosed data
to the state. Article 15.10(a) states. "It a Party requires. as a condition
of approxving the marketing of a new pharmaceutical . . .productL the
submission of undisclosed data concerning safety or efficacy, the Party shall
not permit third peisons, without the consent of the peison xxho proxvided the
information, to market a product on the basis of (1) the information, or (2) the
approval granted to the person who submitted the information for at least five

years for pharmaceutical
products
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essence, when a state
necessitates safety and
efficacy testing. the state
cannot pernit a third
party to nmanufactura
generic equixvalcnt of
the drug unless the third
party performs its oxxn
safety and etticacy tests
or receives appioval
from
the
original
manu.tu.rer.
U nlike

CATA-DR ,
TRIPS proxides WTO1
members xwith extensixve flexibility wxith regard to test data, onlx assertmng
that WTO meinbers should protect "undisclosed test or other data" against
untair commercial use and disclosure. 46 I)urin the ITRIPS negotiations,
developed nations zealously lobbied lon the inclusion ot a data exclusixvitx
proxvision; hoxxexver, this proxvision is noticeablx absent. In fact, TRIPS
proxvides that to protect thc public, member nations can alloss a gcneric
manufactuirer to utilize the patent holder's safetx and efflcacx results wvhen
necessary.
innally, CFiIA-R mandates protection of test data that has been
submitted in a nation that is not a party to CAFTAI -DR. Aiticle I15.10(1 )(b)
torbids generic manufactuers fiom using satety and efficacy test results
from a patcent application filed in a separate state.
For example, the
United States applies for a patent for Drug A in the Dominican Republic
and submits results from the safty and Jflcacy tests Thanks to CAFTA
DR. thc U.S. nosy holds a xirtual monopoly oxer the drug for a pei'iod of
fixe years. Immediately beforc the fivc-year data exclusivity period ends.
the US applies for a patent for lDrug A in Ecuador beginning a new liveyear data exclusiv ity period. Uder the restrictions of CALFIA-DR, generic
manufacturers in Ecuador were already unable to use safety and efficacy
results submitted by the US. in the Dominican Republic. Once the .S.
submits safety and efficacy results foi the 1Ecuadoiian patent. a news fivexeam data exclusivity period begins in that country. In effect IEcuadom wxill
be unable to access test results to produce generics ot IDrug A tom a total
of ten y ears -five y ears during the data exclusixvity hold in the Dominican
Republic and fixve xyears once the data xwas subsequentlx submitted in
Ecuador.
Data exclusixvity is a mechanism designed to delay the introduction of
generic competition. By mandating fise years in wshich third paities can
not produce generics. CAIA-I)R, unlike ITRIPS, exven further pinesveats
access to affordable generics by failing to include many ot the flexibilities
inherent in TRIPS.

WTO
C members purposefully incorporated flexibilities into TIPIIS to
protect public health, especially access to medicines by individuals,
if needed. The U.S., on the other hand was disappointed with the
incorporation of these accommodating provisions and, in response,

promoted the adoption of more stringent intellectual
property protections through bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements. CAFTA-DR may economically
benefit the Latin American countries that are parties
to the treaty, but at the same time, it impinges on
the ability of small pharmaceutical companies to
manufacture generics. Consequently, intellectual
property protections of this nature ultimately harm
the impoverished individuals in foreign countries by
limiting their access to affordable medicines.
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